for their serious and thoughtprovoking responses to my arguments regarding culture, society and biology.
concerned with broad, cross-cultural explanations. Considering the ultimate causes of behaviour almost inevitably leads one to examine the validity of proximate factors, as Martin Daly and Margo Wilson have done with regard to the effects of 'subcultures of violence', step-parenthood, economic inequality and life expectancy on homicide.
2 Alongside identifying psychological universals -as important as that is -an evolutionary perspective helps understand cultural variation and even human individuality. In a similar sense, I think
Wiener is partly right that the 'natural field' of an evolutionarily informed methodology is social history 'rather than diplomatic or "high" political history'; however, although behavioural patterns do become more visible in larger populations, political history may nonetheless be a valuable context for evolutionary perspectives. This is particularly so regarding historical periods in which political power was far more direct and personal than today. Jerome Kroll and Bernard S. Bachrach, for example, have made an intriguing attempt to address the influence of evolutionary psychology in medieval dynastic arrangements. 3 The potential for developing such an approach, I think, has barely been explored.
Finally, I share Wiener's interest in 'co-evolutionary' processes, since, clearly, biological evolution did not 'cease effectively operating' when cultural evolution 'began'
(whenever that might have been 1939, but 'de-civilization' processes came to play an even larger role in later work, where he also emphasized the distinction between 'irreversible biological evolution in Darwin's sense and the development of human societies, which takes place in the framework of the same biological species and which, under certain identifiable conditions, can be partly or completely reversed'. 12 In his analysis of the rise of Nazism, Elias argued that, as Abram de Swaan has put it, '"civilization" is not a permanent state but rather a precarious process, that may very well reverse itself'. 13 (Even his original interest in 'civilization' seems to have been sparked by witnessing its disintegration in Germany. 14 ) Other scholars have further developed the notion of de-civilization, which is now an important element in figurational sociology. 15 It is also utterly wrong to claim that Elias believed the psyche 'underwent an extraordinary transformation, gaining a super-ego for the first time' in the sixteenth century.
Response to Wiener and Rosenwein, final format, 6
Elias never claimed the sudden emergence (at any point in history) of a previously absent psychological mechanism of self-control, and he was always adamant that his concepts could only be understood in a relative sense:
Our habits of thinking incline us to look for 'beginnings'; but there is nowhere in the development of people a 'point' before which one could say: hitherto there was no 'ratio' and now it has 'arisen'; hitherto there were no self-compulsions and no 'superego' and now, in this or that century, they are suddenly there. There is no zero-point in all of these data. 16 This clear statement -from the same book Rosenwein quotes selectively to claim the opposite -reflects Elias's consistent emphasis throughout his life's work on gradual change and the relative nature of social comparisons. Although Rosenwein sees evidence of self-control before the Age of Absolutism as a refutation of Elias's theory, it was something of which Elias was already aware. 17 Nor did he leave 'all but the last 500 years of European history in the dust': in The Civilizing Process, he often discussed social changes reaching back as far as the eleventh or twelfth centuries. (Even if it is true that most of Elias's work deals with postmedieval history, it would seem somehow inappropriate -from our highly specialized ageto reproach him for limiting his research to a mere half-millennium.) Rosenwein might dislike
Elias's depiction of medieval society, but she cannot fairly claim that he ignored it.
Rosenwein, finally, rejects linking Elias's sociology to evolutionary psychology because the former is 'not biological' and fails to 'accord with' the latter's focus on the Pleistocene as the key era in which human mental mechanisms were formed. (Curiously, having labelled the 'Cosmides/Tooby school' as 'not very biological', they subsequently appear in her list of 'biological sciences' when it comes to attacking Elias.) No one could claim that Elias was a biologist, but he did concentrate on the ways that social and cultural processes interacted with a psychology produced by evolution. He may never have referred to the 'environment of evolutionary adaptedness', but he was convinced that human nature (the 'central, unalterable factor in all societies' 18 ) was the source not only of universals in different societies but also of their particularities and tendencies to change. Suggesting a 'good and serious examination question which is set all too infrequently', he asked, 'Which biological characteristics are prerequisites for the changeability, and particularity for the capacity for development, shown by human societies?' 19 His own answer was that people are naturally adapted to change and constitutionally equipped with organs which enable them to learn constantly, to store up new experiences all the time, to adjust their behaviour correspondingly, and to change the pattern of their social life together. Their peculiar changefulness, which has arisen through evolutionary change, is itself the changeless factor at issue here. 20 Nevertheless, Rosenwein finds my attempt to bring together Elias's theory and evolutionary psychology 'forced' and based merely on 'a few parallels'. I disagree, but my point in any case was never to suggest that Elias and evolutionary psychologists have said the same things.
Had they done so, there would have been little reason to point it out. Instead, I argued thatthrough very different routes -they had reached some significant and intriguingly overlapping conclusions about psychology and social life. Elias might have had a somewhat vague view of the natural basis of human beings' 'peculiar changefulness', but this is one of the areas where evolutionary psychology and other biological perspectives can be most helpful. Steven Pinker has recently observed that Elias's emphasis on 'increases in selfcontrol, long-term planning, and sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others' are 'precisely the functions that today's cognitive neuroscientists attribute to the prefrontal cortex', and he draws attention to the issue of why growing social complexity encouraged greater reliance on such innate mental abilities. 21 Brain scans alone will not provide an answer to that question. While there are challenges in bringing together two different approaches to behaviour, I think they are outweighed by the potential for developing a framework that connects 'neurochemical phenomena' to the histories (and 'metahistories' to which Wiener refers) of social interaction, state development and cultural inventiveness. Rosenwein seems to see theories as fixed, static things to be adopted or discarded whole cloth, but this is a view I find needlessly short sighted.
In conclusion, however, the fact that both respondents advocate a significant role for biological perspectives on history (even if we disagree to varying extents about precisely what it can or should be) allows me to end my own essay on positive note. Indeed, both Wiener and Rosenwein, in one way or another, have argued that the evolutionary psychology about which I mainly wrote does not go far enough in the analysis of biological influences on human behaviour. Given the comments that sparked my original article and my personal experience with some historians' intense dislike of biological explanations of behaviour, this was not
